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We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an
exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine
the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking
of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition
function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which
existsandincludesthecore. Weinvestigateareﬁnement,thestronglystablesocial
order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We
provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.
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1. Introduction
Power relations are a fundamental component of human interaction. In social environ-
ments, two types of power shape a signiﬁcant number of human relations: individual
power and group power. Individual power manifests itself in one-to-one relations and
generally originates from material or psychological strength. Group power manifests
itself in interactions between sets of individuals or in one-to-one interactions between
individuals belonging to different sets. The objective of this paper is to study theoret-
ically the joint inﬂuence of individual and group power in the determination of social
arrangements. Although the term “individual” usually refers to “one person,” in this pa-
per “individuals” can be entities such as families, factions, or other groupings, the unity
of which is solid and based on exogenous, non-strategic factors such as blood, loyalty,
or friendship. Henceforth, such individuals or families are referred to as “agents.”
We are interested in analyzing the structure of a society driven by power relations.
Our model has the following basic ingredients. Power is represented by an exogenous
binary relation over coalitions. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions.
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The power relation and the structure of the social order determine the ranking of agents
in society.
Coalitions, in our model, are held together only by strategic considerations. We as-
sume that the objective of each agent is to maximize his/her position in the societal
ranking. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a so-
lution concept, the stable social order. We show that for any power relation, the set of
stable social orders is not empty and contains the core. We investigate a reﬁnement,
the strongly stable social order, which requires that a social order be stable for all power
relations. We provide a complete characterization (Theorem 1) of strongly stable social
orders.
Our framework is too abstract to ﬁt speciﬁc historical examples. However, several
implications of our results are broadly consistent with stylized historical and political
anecdotes. In particular, in a strongly stable social order:
1. Powerful coalitions are large and each coalition is immune from the threat of a
uniﬁed challenge coming from all less powerful coalitions.
2. Leaders are critical. The elimination of society’s most powerful member causes
a regime switch: almost all the members of the coalition in power divide into
smaller coalitions and signiﬁcantly drop in status.
As we shall see, the robustness criterion implicit in strongly stable social orders is
rather demanding. Hence, we conclude the paper by focusing on social orders that are
stable (not necessarily strongly stable) for special power relations.
1.1 A simple example
As an illustration of our model and of stable social orders, consider a special case in
which the power of individual agents and coalitions is modeled as follows. Each agent
i is represented by a number q(i); agent i is more powerful than agent j if and only
if q(i) > q(j). When comparing disjoint coalitions of individuals, the power relation
is determined additively, i.e., coalition A is more powerful than coalition B whenever P
i2Aq(i) >
P
i2B q(i). Suppose that the numbers q(i) are decreasing in i; that is, agent
1 is the most powerful, agent 2 is the second most powerful, and so on. Also suppose
that all numbersq(i) are approximately the same; that is, a coalition of m agents is more
powerful than any coalition with fewer than m agents, and that no two coalitions have
the same power.
The agents care only about their social ranking, which is determined by their own
individual power and by the power of the coalitions to which they belong.
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powerful one. Second, within a coalition, a more powerful agent is ranked higher than
a less powerful one. Thus, agent 1 is ranked ﬁrst as he is in the most powerful coalition
and is the most powerful individual in this coalition. Agent 3 is ranked second, agent 2
is ranked ﬁfth and so on.
We analyze the stability of partitions such as ^ . One possible stability notion is the
core. We say that a social order is in the core if there does not exist a subset of agents
who can strictly improve their social rank by forming a new coalition. The above social
order is not in the core. If agents 3, 5, and 7 form a new coalition C0 dropping agent 1,
they strictly improve their social rank in the resulting social order
^ 0 =ff3,5,7g,f2,6g,f1g,f4gg.
Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) show, for the above power relation, that the core is
empty when N > 6. In this paper, we provide a solution concept for which existence is
not problematic and that offers interesting insights into coalition formation in the pres-
ence of power relations. We follow the traditional route of reducing the set of proﬁtable
deviations by allowing counter-deviations. In particular, our stable social order incorpo-
rates two features:
(i) A recursive deﬁnition of “durable” deviations and counter-deviations.
(ii) A sequential notion of counter-deviations: members of a deviating coalition do
not participate in any immediately subsequent counter-deviation.
The social order ^  is stable according to our deﬁnition. In particular, (all) members
of the coalitionC0 =f3,5,7g in ^ 0 are made worse off by the “durable” counter-deviation
C00 = f1,2,4,6g. Although the formal deﬁnition of durable counter-deviations is recur-
sive, for the moment it is sufﬁcient to note that C00 is durable in that agents 1, 2, 4, and
6 are better off than they are in ^ 0 and cannot subsequently be made worse off by any
coalition of agents who are not in C00.
As we shall see, the social order ^  is also strongly stable. That is, it is stable for any
selection of the numbers q(i) that are decreasing in i; irrespective of the cardinal prop-
erties of q, the agents in C0 are made worse off by the counter-deviation C00 and the
agents in C00 cannot be made worse off.
1.2 Related literature
This paper is obviously part of the vast literature on cooperative games, solution con-
cepts, and coalition formation. We refer the reader to Ray (2007) for a detailed and
insightful overview. Games in partition function form are studied in Thrall and Lucas
(1963), Myerson (1977), andRayandVohra(1999). Our solutionconceptisrelatedtothe
notion of the “Bargaining Set” of Aumann and Maschler (1964) and, in particular, to a
modiﬁcationduetoDuttaetal.(1989);forothernotionsofstabilityseeChwe(1994),Ray
and Vohra (1997), Greenberg (1990), and Diamantoudi and Xue (2007). Formal models
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Acemoglu et al. (2008). Jordan (2006a) considers a model in which power is endoge-
nous and is affected by the wealth that is appropriated from other agents through the
exercise of power. Jordan (2006b) incorporates dynamic factors such as histories into
the notion of stability, thus introducing a notion of “legitimacy” into the appropriation
process. Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) study a model in which the allocation of re-
sources is driven by exogenous power. In this paper, we report a result from Piccione
and Rubinstein (2004) that is omitted from Piccione and Rubinstein (2007). Acemoglu
et al. (2008) also assume that power is exogenous and study the formation of coalitions
under an allocation rule for which the winning coalition takes all.
2. The model
The set of agents is I = f1,...,Ng. Although the term “agent” is commonly associated
with “one person”, in our model an agent can be a clan, a family, or any group of people
held together by non-strategic factors. The agents are ordered by an exogenous power
relation. We deﬁne a “coalitional” power relation over sets of agents as a binary relation
P between subsets (coalitions) of agents A,B  I such that A \ B = ?. The relation P is
asymmetric, acyclic,1 and such that either A P B or B P A. The statement A P B is inter-
preted as “coalition A is more powerful than coalition B.” We assume that A P ? when-
ever A  I is non-empty. Note that two disjoint coalitions cannot be equally powerful.
Without loss of generality we assume that P agrees with the naming of agents
f1,...,Ng. That is, f1g P f2g, f2g P f3g, ..., fN   1g P fNg. In what follows, quantiﬁers
such as “for any power relation P” should be interpreted as “for any power relation P for
which f1gPf2g, f2gPf3g, ..., fN  1gPfNg.” With some abuse of notation we sometimes
replace figP fjg with i P j.
We deﬁne a social order as a partition of the set of agents. We often denote a social
order by  and adopt the convention that in the social order fC1,...,CKg, Ci P Cj if and
only if i < j.
The power relation P is separable if, for any subsets of agents A1, A2, A3, and A4 such
that Ai \Aj =? for i 6= j, A1 P A3 and A2 P A4 implies that
(A1 [A2)P (A3 [A4)
ConsidertwocoalitionsofagentsA,B  I suchthatA\B =?. CoalitionA dominates
coalition B if there exists a subset C  A and a one-to-one mapping  : B  ! C such
that i P  1(i) for any i 2(B). The next lemmas are useful later.
Lemma 1. Suppose P is separable. If A P B and C  B, then A P C.
Proof. Supposenot. AcontradictionisobtainedbydeﬁningA1 =C,A2 = BnC,A3 =A,
and A4 =?. 
1The relation P is acyclic if, given any collection  of subsets of agents, there exists A 2 such that B PA
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Lemma 2. Suppose P is separable. Then A P B whenever A dominates B.
This result follows from a simple application of separability.
The power relation P is monotonic if for any two subsets of agents A1 and A2 such
that A1 \A2 =?, A1 P A2 implies that
((A1 [fig)nfjg)P ((A2 [fjg)nfig)
whenever i 2A2 and i P j.
Lemma 3. If P is separable, then P is monotonic.
Proof. Consider two subsets of agents A1 and A2 such that A1 \A2 = ? and A1 P A2.
Take i 2 A2 and any j such that i P j. First suppose that (A2 nfig)P (A1 nfjg). Then, by
separability,
((A2 nfig)[fig)P ((A1 nfjg)[fjg).
Since A1 (A1nfjg)[fjg, a contradiction is obtained by Lemma 1. Hence (A1nfjg)P
(A2 nfig). The claim follows by separability. 
Intheremainderofthepaper, weassumethatpowerrelationsareseparable. Finally,
we deﬁne the social ranking that is induced by a social order. Given a power relation P
and a social order  = fC1,...,CKg, let V P
i () denote agent i’s position in the ranking
induced by . That is, V P
i () = 1 indicates that agent i is ranked the highest, V P
i () = 5
indicates that agent i is ranked ﬁfth, and so on. Formally, V P
i () assigns to each agent i
an integer in f1,2,...,Ng and satisﬁes
V P
i ()<V P
j () if and only if
either i,j 2Ck for some k and i P j
or i 2Ck,j 2Ck0, and Ck P Ck0.
(*)
We say that agent i is ranked “higher” in  than in 0 whenever V P
i () < V P
i (0). We
assume that each agent’s preferences over social orders are determined by the induced
social rankings. In particular, each agent strictly prefers to be ranked higher in the social
ranking to being ranked lower. That is, each agent i strictly prefers the social order 
to the social order 0 if and only if V P
i () < V P
i (0). We also say, given  = fC1,...,CKg,
that Ck is ranked kth and that Ck is ranked higher than Ck0 whenever k < k0 (recall that
Ck P Ck0 by convention).
3. Stability
We introduce a cooperative solution concept for social orders that we call stable social
order. For any subset C of agents who deviate from a social order  = fC1,...,CKg, with
some abuse of the conventional notation let  üC be the partition fC1 nC,C2 nC,...,
CK nC,Cg. We say that a deviation by C from  is proﬁtable if V P
i (üC)<V P
i () for any
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Our stability notion is based on the durability of deviations by coalitions of agents.
Two criteria need to be satisﬁed by a durable deviation. First, all members in the devi-
ating coalition are better off. Second, there does not exist a durable counter-deviation
that makes some member in the original deviating coalition worse off than in the social
order prior to the deviation. It should be noted that members of the deviating coalition
are excluded from the counter-deviating coalition.
Wenowdeﬁnedurabledeviations. LetbethesetofsocialordersandI bethesetof
all possible subsets of I. Deﬁne the correspondence S P :  =) I such that C 2 S P()
if and only if
(a) C is a proﬁtable deviation from 
(b) there does not exist C0 2S P(üC) such that
(i) C \C0 =?
(ii) V P
i ((üC)üC0))>V P
i () for some i 2C.
A deviation C from a social order  is durable if C 2 S P(). The following propo-
sition shows that the mapping S P :  =) I exists and is unique, notwithstanding its
self-referential nature.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique correspondence S P :  =) I that satisﬁes (a) and
(b).
Proof. Given a social order  and a coalition C with a proﬁtable deviation from , let
˜ S (,C)=fC0  I : (i) C \C0 =?
(ii) C0 is a proﬁtable deviation from üC.
(iii) V P
i ((üC)üC0))>V P
i () for some i 2Cg.
Consider all ﬁnite sequences fBtg
t=0 of subsets of agents such that
 B0 =C
 0 =, t+1 =t ü Bt
 Bt 2 ˜ S (t 1,Bt 1), Bt \ Bt 1 =? for t >0
 either ˜ S (t 1,Bt 1) 6= ? for any t   and ˜ S (,B) = ?, or ˜ S (t 1,Bt 1) 6= ?
for any t and =1.
Note that, by (ii) and (iii) in the deﬁnition of ˜ S , each member of Bt is better off
in +1 than in  and that at least one member of Bt is worse off in +2 than in .
Hence, Bt P Bt 1 for every t > 0. Thus, by acyclicity, there exists a ﬁnite bound for
 that is common to all sequences fBtg
t=0. Since ˜ S (,B) = ?, if B 2 S P( ü B)
then B \ B 6= ?. Hence, B 2 S P() and B 1 = 2 S P( 1). Consider now a directed
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immediately precedes Bt+1 in the same sequence. If none of the immediate successors
of Bt is in S P(t üBt), then Bt 2S P(t). If at least one immediate successor of Bt is in
S P(t ü Bt), then Bt = 2 S P(t). Proceeding by backward induction in this fashion, we
determine uniquely whether C 2S P(). 
The example in Section 1.1 clariﬁes the intuition behind this result. The coalition
C00 is a durable deviation from ^ 0 since the agents in C00 cannot be made worse off by
any coalition of agents who are not in C00. Working backwards, one deduces that the
coalition C0 is not a durable deviation from ^ .
We are now ready to deﬁne the stability of a social order.
Definition 1. Asocialorder=fC1,...,CKgisstableforapowerrelationP ifS P()=?.
One can reﬁne the stability notion by requiring that social orders are stable for any
power relation.
Definition 2. A social order  = fC1,...,CKg is strongly stable if S P() = ? for any
power relation P.
The requirements for a strongly stable social order are severe but can be partially
justiﬁed on robustness grounds. It is natural to think of the power of coalitions as more
variable and harder to assess than the power of individuals.2 The aggregate strength of
a group can depend on characteristics of social interaction that are unobservable and
difﬁcult to evaluate.
4. The main result
In this section, we introduce and prove our main result. First we introduce some special
social orders.
The social order  is constructed according to a simple procedure. First, select the
odd-indexed agents to form the strongest coalition. Re-index the remaining agents so
thatthemostpowerfulagentisindexedasagent10,thesecondmostpowerfulisindexed
as agent 20 and so on. Select the odd indexed agents from this set to form the second
strongest coalition. Repeat this procedure until no agents are left. For example, when
N =8,  =ff1,3,5,7g,f2,6g,f4g,f8gg.
Formally, given a set of numbersQ = fa,b,c,d,...g and a number , let Q denote
the set fa,b,c,d,...g. Let O+ be the set of the positive odd integers. Deﬁne the
social order  as the social order fC
1,...,C
Kg such thatC
k = I \2k 1O+, where K is the
largest k for which C
k = I \2k 1O+ is non-empty.
Consider the class F of social orders derived by modifying  recursively in the fol-
lowing fashion. A social order =fC1,...,CKg is in F if and only if
1. C1 =C
1 or C1 =C
1 [fNg
2. for k 2, Ck =fC
k n[k 1
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For N =8, the social order ff1,3,5,7,8g,f2,6g,f4gg is in F as it is obtained by adding
agent 8 to C
1. It is worth noting two features common to the social orders in F. First,
the coalitions are highly differentiated in that agents who are contiguous in power gen-
erally belong to different coalitions: with the possible exception of the two least power-
ful agents, for any two agents x and y in any coalition C for whom x P y, there exists an
agent z not inC such that x P z and z P y. Second, any coalitionC dominates the union
of all coalitions that are less powerful than C.
Theorem 1. A social order  is a strongly stable social order if and only if 2F.
The proof of this result is constructive. We ﬁrst prove that  is stable for any P (the
proof that any  2 F is stable for any P is analogous and thus omitted). We then prove
that any strongly stable social order must be in F.
Proof of Theorem 1. We ﬁrst establish some preliminary results.




This result is proved by construction.
Claim 2. Fixsomepartitionsuchthat C




i () for each i 2C, there exists C0 with C0 \C =? such that
(i) C0 is a proﬁtable deviation from  üC
(ii) V P
i (( üC)üC0))>V P
i () for some i 2C
(iii) C0 P ((I nC)nC0).
Proof. DenoteC
1 =fy1,...,yLg andC =fx1,...,xMg. ConstructC0 =fz1,...,zLg by ﬁrst
lettingz1 =y1 =1. Supposewehavedeﬁnedzi foralli ¶ j forsome j ¾1. Deﬁnez j+1 as
the smallest i such that (i) i = 2C, (ii) i 6=z1,...,z j, (iii) V P
i (üC)> j +1, and (iv) i yj+1.
We now show that this algorithm is well deﬁned. We consider several cases.
Case 1: In üC, C is ranked ﬁrst and C
1 nC is ranked second.
First note that either z2 = 2, or 2 2 C and therefore 3 = 2 C implying z2 = 3. There-
fore, z2 ¶y2. Now consider z j, j >2, given that z1,...,z j 1 have been selected us-
ing the algorithm. LetGj be the set of agents smaller than or equal to yj = 2j  1.
By hypothesis, j  1 agents inGj have already been allocated to C0. We now show
that the set Hj = fr 2 Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g : r = 2 C and V P
r (üC) > jg is not empty.
Since #Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g = j, it is impossible that all agents in Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g
are in C. If so, agent 2j   1 would also be in C but ranked at or lower than the
j th position in üC, contradicting the deﬁnition ofC. Therefore, there must exist
at least one agent i 2 Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g such that i = 2 C. Consider then the agent
r in Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g who is ranked lowest in üC. Agent r is not in C as oth-
erwise Gj n fz1,...,z j 1g  C. Since C
1 nC is ranked second, agent r must be
ranked lower than agent 1 in üC. Since agent 1 is not in Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g and
#Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g= j, V P
r(üC)> j. Hence, Hj is not empty. Deﬁne z j =minHj.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Coalition formation under power relations 9
Case 2: In üC, C is ranked ﬁrst and C
1 nC is ranked lower than second.
Again, either z2 =2, or 22C and therefore 3 = 2C implying z2 =3. Consider z j, j >
2. As in Case 1, #Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g = j. Denote the agents in Gj nfz1,...,z j 1g by
1 <  < j. We need to show that in üC one k is ranked strictly lower than
the j th position. If agent 2j  1 is not in C, then the claim is obvious as C
1 nC is
ranked lower than second. Hence, we can suppose that agent 2j  1 is in C. Note
that it is impossible that all agents 1,...,j are in C. If so, agent j = 2j   1 is
ranked no higher than j th in C, contradicting the deﬁnition of C. Also, if agent
2j   1 is not the lowest ranked agent in C, agents not in 1,...,j are also in C.
Since not all agents 1,...,j are in C, one k must be ranked strictly lower than




2 . Inthiscase,z2 =2and
agent 2 is not in 1,...,j. Since some agents in 1,...,j are not in C and agent
2 is the highest ranked agent in C
üC
2 , one k must be ranked strictly lower than
the j th position. Hence, if C does not contain an even agent, the claim is proved.
Suppose then that C does contain an even agent. Note further that for this even
agent , <2j  1, as otherwise agent 2j  1 is not the lowest ranked in C.
To summarize, in order to conclude the proof of Case 2, we suppose that
(i) not all 1,...,j are in C
(ii) 2j  1 is the lowest ranked agent in C
(iii) C contains an even agent.
Also, if C
üC
2 contains an agent zk, k < j, (i) implies that at least one l must be
rankedstrictlylowerthanthe j th positioninüC. Ifnot,agentzk isrankedstrictly
lower than the j th position in üC, the agent l who is ranked j th in üC is in
C
üC




2 does not contain any agents in z1,...,z j 1.
Now let  be the set C
1 \C. Given any (2k  1) 2C, k < j, if q odd agents smaller
than or equal to (2k   1) are in C, at least q even agents who are smaller than
(2k  1)areinz1,...,z j 1. By(ii), atleast# 1evenagentsmustbeinz1,...,z j 1.
By (iii), call 0 the set composed of these even agents and one even agent i0 from
C. We can now construct a one-to-one mapping g :  ! 0 such that g(z) < z.
First, let g(2j  1) = i0 < 2j  1 by (ii) and (iii). Let  = f1,...,mg, i < i+1. It is
easy to see that there must be an even agent i 2 0 nfi0g such that i < 1. Deﬁne
g(1) as the lowest such number. Suppose that for k  1 agents i, i <k, k >1, we
have constructed g(z). Since k odd agents smaller than or equal to k are in C,
there must exist k even agents in z1,...,zk who are smaller than k. Hence, there10 Piccione and Razin Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
must be an even agent 0
k > g(k 1) with 0
k 2 0 nfi0g and 0
k < k. Let g(k) be
the highest ranked such agent.
Hence, 0 dominates . By (iv), 0 \C
üC
2 = ?. Since C




1) n 0) by separability. Since C
üC
2 is contained in (N nC




2 , a contradiction.
Case 3: C is not ranked ﬁrst in üC.
LetC
üC
1 be the highest ranked coalition in üC. SinceC









3. Continuing in this fashion, we establish that C \C
1 =?, a contradiction.
Byconstruction,C0 isaproﬁtabledeviationfromüC. ToseethatV P
i ((üC)üC0)>
V P
i () for some i 2C, take any ^ x 2C \C
1. Agent ^ x’s position is weakly higher than the
Lth position in  and strictly lower than the Lth position in ( üC)üC0.
Finally, we show that C0 P ((I n C) n C0). Indeed, our construction ensures that
C0 P (I nC0). By Claim 1, C
1 P (I nC
1). Since C0 is derived from C
1 by exchanging less
powerful agents in C
1 for more powerful agents in I n C
1, monotonicity implies that
C0 P (I nC0). Ã
To prove stability, ﬁx some partition  such that C
1,C
2 2 and minC
3 2C3. For any
C such that C
1 \C = ?, C
2 \C 6= ?, and V P
i (üC) < V P
i () for each i 2 C, construct
a counter-deviation C00 that is constructed analogously to C0 in Claim 2 (ignoring the
agents in C
1). Namely, denoting C
2 = fy1,...,yL0g and C = (x1,...,xM0), construct C00 =
fz1,...,zL0g by ﬁrst letting z1 = y1 = 2. Having deﬁned zi for all i ¶ j for some j ¾
1, deﬁne z j+1 as the smallest i such that (i) i = 2 C, (ii) i 6= z1,...,z j, (iii) V P
i ( üC) >
j +1+#C
1, and (iv) i  yj+1. The deviation C00 is durable; any counter-deviation to C00
in (üC)üC
00 cannot be durable by Claim 2.
The completion of the proof of stability is obtained by an inductive repetition of
these arguments.
Finally, we need to show that if  is strongly stable then  2 F. First, we show that
any ranking of agents induced by a strongly stable social order must rank the agents in
C
1 as in .
Agent 1 needs to be ranked ﬁrst: consider a power relation such that f1gP (I nf1g).
To see that agent 3 must be at least second, consider P such that f2,3gP(I nf2,3g). Since
agent 1 must be ﬁrst, if agent 3 is not second, he can deviate forming a coalition with
agent 2. Now consider agent 5 and assume he is ranked lower than the third position.
ChooseP suchthatf2,4,5gP(Inf2,4,5g). Sinceagents1and3areﬁrstandsecond,agents
2 and 4 can form a coalition with agent 5 and improve their rank. Suppose we have
shown that all agents 2i  1 2 C
1 are in the ith position. Consider the agent 2i +1 2 C
1
and suppose he is below the (i +1)th position. Choose P such that f2,4,6,...,2i,2i +1gP
(I nf2,4,6,...,2i,2i +1g). Since f1,3,5,...,2i  1g are ranked in the 1,...,ith positions,
agents f2,4,6,...,2ig can form a coalition with 2i +1 and improve their rank.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Coalition formation under power relations 11
Now it is easy to verify that no agent in C
1 can belong to a coalition that contains
agents who are not in C
1 with the exception of agent N . To show that all agents in C
1
must belong to the same coalition, choose P such that f2gP (I nf1,2g).
To characterise C2, repeat the arguments above for social orders where the set of
agents is I nC1. To ensure that deviations analogous to the ones in the previous para-
graphs are durable when the set of agents is I, it is sufﬁcient to consider P’s such that
f1gP (I nf1g), as no agent in C1 would then join a counter-deviation. Repeating these
arguments for all Ci’s concludes the proof. 
5. Remarks on the stability concept
5.1 Axioms for strong stability
The proof of Theorem 1 is quite complex. To gain some insights into the main argu-
ments, we provide a simple and intuitive axiomatic characterization of the social orders
in F that underscores their stability properties.
(K1) A social order  = fC1,...,CKg is such that Ci dominates [K
j=i+1Cj for any i =
1,...,K.
(K2) A social order =fC1,...,CKg is such that for all i =1,...,K , the rank of any agent
j 2Ci within Ci is at least as high as his rank within the set ([K
l=i+1Cl)[fjg.
Axiom (K1) is a criterion for external stability: all coalitions are immune from the
threat of a uniﬁed challenge coming from all weaker coalitions. Axiom (K2) is a criterion
for internal stability in that agents in a coalition never wish to join a united challenge by
all weaker coalitions.
Proposition 2.  satisﬁes (K1) and (K2) if and only if 2F.
Proof. First note that any  2 F satisﬁes (K1) and (K2). Now consider a social order
 = fC1,...,CKg that satisﬁes (K1) and (K2). By (K1), agent 1 is in C1. By (K2), agent 2
cannot be in C1. By (K1) again, agent 3 is in C1. By (K2) again, agent 4 cannot be in C1.
Repeating these arguments up to maxC1 implies that C1  C





1 6=?, (K2) implies that any agent j 2C1nC
1 must be ranked worse than all agents
in [K
l=i+1Cl and #C1nC
1 1. The same arguments for the other coalitions establish that
2F. 
Note that strongly stable social orders depend critically on coalition leaders. In par-
ticular, eliminating agent 1 from the set of agents causes a major upset in the social
structure. The new most powerful coalition is composed of agents who were not in C
1,
while those agents who were inC
1 are now divided into smaller and less powerful coali-
tions. In contrast, eliminating the lowest individual in society does not affect the social
order except for the absence of that agent.12 Piccione and Razin Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
5.2 The core
In the previous section, we show that the set of (strongly) stable social orders is not
empty. However, a standard solution concept such as the core can be empty in our
framework. A social order  = fC1,...,CKg is in the core if no coalition of agents is a
proﬁtable deviation.
WesaythattherelationP ishomogeneous ifacoalitionofm agentsismorepowerful
than any coalition of strictly fewer than m agents. The next proposition is from Piccione
and Rubinstein (2004).
Proposition 3. If P is homogeneous, the core is empty when N 7.
Proof. We ﬁrst establish the following claims.
Claim 1. The least powerful coalition CK in  has either 1 or 2 agents.
Proof. If not, all agents in CK except for the most powerful can form a coalition that
strictly improves their ranking. Ã
Claim 2. #Cj+1 #Cj #Cj+1 +1 for j =0,...,K  1.
Proof. The left-hand side follows by deﬁnition and by homogeneity. For the right-
hand side, if #Cj > #Cj+1 +1, all agents in Cj except for the most powerful can form a
coalition that strictly improves their ranking. Ã
Claim 3. #C2 2 and #C1 3.
Proof. If #C2 = 1 then by Claims 1 and 2, K > 5 and #Cj = 1 for j = 2,3,4,...,K. Thus
merging CK and CK 1 improves the ranking of all the members of the new coalition.
Hence, #C2  2. If #C1 = 2, then merging C2 with one element of CK improves the
ranking of all the members of the new coalition. Ã
Since N 7, there are at least two agents who do not belong to eitherC1 orC2. If two
such agents form a coalition with the agents in C2, the ranking of each member of the
new coalition improves. 
Note that, for N = 6, the social order ff1,5,6g,f3,4g,f2gg is in the core when P is
homogeneous and f1,5,6gP f2,3,4g.
5.3 Existence and farsightedness
Our solution concept is rooted in the theory of cooperative games. Stable social orders
are deﬁned as collections of coalitions that agents do not ﬁnd in their interest or are
unable to destabilize by forming new coalitions. Speciﬁcally, agents consider forming a
new coalition if (i) they are all better off and (ii) they do not expect the formation of a
retaliatory coalition that excludes them and makes some of them worse off.
Existence is one of the main advantages of our solution concept, as is highlighted
by the emptiness of the core. The assumption that the agents in a deviating coalition doTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) Coalition formation under power relations 13
notparticipateinanyimmediatelysubsequentcounter-deviationisespeciallyhelpfulto
this end.3 Moreover, we ﬁnd this restriction natural if counter-deviations are retaliatory.
A standard objection to this approach is that agents do not consistently foresee the
ﬁnal consequences of their deviations. According to this criticism, the only consider-
ation that should guide the decision by a set of agents forming a new coalition is their
equilibrium expectation of the stable social order that ensues. This objection ultimately
applies to all cooperative approaches to coalition formation known to us, and a satis-
factory resolution is well beyond the scope of this paper. We wish to point out, however,
that one need not treat coalition formation as effortless in a cooperative approach. As
forming coalitions requires a high degree of coordination and common intent, one can
argue that some coalitions are formed more easily than others. It is implicit in our ap-
proach that conditions (i) and (ii) above facilitate the coordination of agents forming a
new coalition whereas the absence of either condition makes it demanding. Indeed, (i)
and (ii) are very natural considerations. Stable social order can be interpreted as “ro-
bust” structures from which such considerations are absent and in which the formation
of new, destabilizing coalitions is hindered.
6. Special power relations
We are unable to provide a complete characterization of stable social orders under an
arbitrary power relation. In this section, we explore social orders that are stable for par-
ticular power relations.
6.1 Congruence
Generally, stable social orders induce a ranking of agents that differs from the ranking of
agents under P. The next proposition shows that a ranking of agents that agrees with P
can be induced by a stable social order if and only if agent 1 is more powerful than the
coalition of all remaining agents.
Proposition 4. There exists a stable social order  such that V P
i ()=i for i =1,2...,N if
and only if f1gP f2,3,...,Ng.
Proof. If f1gP f2,3,...,Ng, consider the social order with only one coalition. For any
deviating coalition C, let j be the agent ranked highest in C. It is easy to verify that
j cannot be ranked higher than the j th position. Consider a social order  such that
V P
i () = i, i = 1,2...,N, and assume that f2,3,...,NgP f1g. Obviously f2,3,...,Ng is a
durable deviation and therefore  is not stable. 
6.2 Homogeneous power
Suppose that the power of agents is approximately the same. The following result shows
that, in a stable social order, the most powerful coalition must exclude some of the most
powerful agents.
3When deviations are non-nested, existence is problematic in equilibrium concepts that involve boot-
strapping (see Ray 2007, p. 240).14 Piccione and Razin Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Proposition 5. Consider a stable social order . If P is homogeneous, it is impossible
that f1,2,3gC1.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case of N even and suppose that there exists a stable  such
that f1,2,3g  C1. To obtain a contradiction, take a coalition with agents 2, 3, and all
agents ranked strictly lower than
1
2N +1 in . This deviation is durable. Now consider
the case of N odd and suppose that there exist a stable  such that f1,2,3g  C1. Take
a coalition with agent 2 and all agents ranked strictly lower than
1
2(N + 1) in . This
deviation is again durable. 
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